After spending the last few weeks observing the slow-moving collapse
of the Spanish state, the time has come to put down my thoughts on the idea of Catalan independence. Like in any debate on
nationalism, these thoughts are part rational, part emotional, and like
in any debate relating to identities, someone will probably be offended
(for this reason I never blog on the Middle East). So here goes.
The first point is that there is something vaguely insane about using the term 'independence'
to describe the putative creation of a Catalan state. As a small
European economy, Catalonia would be totally dependent on its neighbours
for trade, and assuming it is allowed to seamlessly remain in the
European Union, it will have little to no real decision-making power
over the issues of the future of the Eurozone and the European
integration process in general. Even more than that, nearly four
centuries of political integration into the rest of Spain has meant that
the Catalan economy is deeply interconnected with the rest of Iberia.
Again, decisions made outside Catalonia - potentially by a bitter Spanish electorate sour at the 'divorce' - will have a major effect on its future.
That
of course doesn't mean Catalonia can't be a successful state in
economic terms. Given the Catalans' famed parsimony, it was predictable
that the debate on 'independence' has actually revolved around the
economic consequences of the split with Spain. As one of the richer
regions in Spain, located closer to the main European markets than other
regions, there is every chance the Catalan economy will do just as well
if not better outside of Spain. But here's the rub - Spain is in
colossal economic trouble, and Catalonia, notwithstanding the supposed 'fiscal dividend'
it would gain from no longer subsidizing poorer Spanish regions, is not
significantly less exposed to the problems facing the Southern
eurozone. Like the rest of Spain, it had a housing boom and bust, its
government has racked up huge deficits since the crisis, and its wage
costs are uncompetitive. However well the secession negotiations could
go, the new Catalan state will remain in the group of troubled Eurozone
economies, and all the signs are that these economies will take a very
long time to return to growth. NB, no Catalan nationalists are
advocating leaving the euro or defaulting on their share of the debt.
The
economic crisis has clearly acted as a trigger for the calls for
independence, but of course Catalan nationalism has long been about much
more than economics. The centrality of the Catalan language and
hostility to the reactionary nationalism of the Spanish right have been
if anything more important in the period since Franco's death, in which
Catalonia, like other 'historic nationalities' in Spain, has acquired
significant powers of self-government. The autonomy enjoyed by the
Catalan government, the Generalitat, has allowed it to push hard on
linguistic policy, ensuring that recent generations of Catalans have
been educated in the Catalan language (as well as learning a
Catalan-centric version of Spanish history). Until recently, most
Catalans were quite happy with their status as a decentralized region
within Spain, which correponded to the largely dual national identity of
the population (which the plurality of Catalans regarding themselves as
both Catalan and Spanish in some measure). The push to independence
marks a significant radicalization of Catalan national claims, and
although it has clearly been building as a strand of Catalan identity
over the past couple of decades, the shift towards independence of the
centre-right CiU party led by Artur Mas is a major departure.
So
the elections will be worth watching for signs of hesitation amongst
the electorate. It is true now that a sizable majority of parties
currently present in the Catalan Parlament are advocating independence,
but these parties represent a percentage of the electorate which is
clearly superior to the numbers expressing support for independence in
the opinion surveys we have available. So the question is, will CiU be
able to drag its more conservative electorate to the pro-independence
camp? The weakness of the two main anti-independence parties - the
Spanish Popular Party and the Catalan affiliate of the Socialist Party -
makes them unlikely beneficiaries of any hesitance in the Catalan
nationalist electorate. But it will be worth taking a close look at
turnout. The Catalan population is actually fairly divided between a
majority of Catalan speakers and a large minority of Castillian
speakers, many of whom are now migrants from Latin America, rather than
from Southern Spain as in the past. Will Spanish-speaking or
Spanish-identifying Catalan citizens really want to go for an
independent state? Will the older generation of Andalusian-born
immigrants who have historically supported the Spanish national level
parties really accept independence? It is true that Catalan nationalism
is more civic and inclusive than, say, Basque nationalism, but how would
non-Catalan speakers feel about the official status of Castillian in a
new independent state?
The debate so far has barely
registered these themes. In fact one of the oddest features of the
campaign has been the intervention of overseas-based academics, most
notably the economist Xavier Sala-i-Martin, becoming vocal and emotive advocates of Catalan 'patriotism', revealing an uncharacteristic lack of seny
(Catalan for a kind of pragmatic common sense). Nationalism is
ultimately an emotive construct which fits ill with rational debate. For
this reason, debate around identities is rarely conducive to sensible
decision-making, as the history of the last couple of centuries has
clearly established. Catalonia does not have to fall into the kind of
disastrous traps of other secession processes, but the insouciance with
which such a major change is being contemplated suggests a lack of
awareness or a short historical memory.
